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U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: 
Comparison and Evaluation 
 
Abstract 
 
In the U.S., the insolvency resolution of most corporations is governed by the federal 
bankruptcy code and is administered by special bankruptcy courts. Most large corporate 
bankruptcies are resolved under Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. However, 
commercial bank insolvencies are governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and are 
administered by the FDIC. These two resolution processes—corporate bankruptcy and 
bank receiverships—differ in a number of significant ways, including the type of 
proceeding (judicial versus administrative); the rights of managers, stockholders and 
creditors in the proceedings; the explicit and implicit goals of the resolution; the 
prioritization of creditors’ claims; the costs of administration; and the timeliness of 
creditor payments. These differences derive from perceptions that “banks are special.” 
This paper elucidates these differences, explores the effectiveness of the procedural 
differences in achieving the stated goals, and considers consequences of the different 
structures. 
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1U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: 
Comparison and Evaluation 
 
I.  Introduction 
When firms become financially insolvent, legal processes are required to 
efficiently and equitably resolve the claims of creditors and other stakeholders. Unlike 
most other countries, in the U.S., two distinct legal processes exist for resolving the 
failures or bankruptcy of commercial banks and most other corporations.1 Underlying 
these two regimes are different assumptions, goals, and strategies for resolution.  In 
contrast, in most countries, resolution of bank insolvencies is guided by the general 
corporate bankruptcy code, e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom, although in some of 
these countries special provisions for banks apply, e.g., Italy, France, and Switzerland.2
Bank insolvencies are resolved differently primarily because banks provide a vital 
service in among other things, issuing liquid deposits, which tend to serve as money, 
extending credit, and processing payments.  It is believed that any interruption in these 
activities, with resulting losses to participants, would have more serious adverse impact 
on the economy of the insolvent bank’s market area than any interruption in the operation 
of other insolvent firms. 
In the United States, the declaration and resolution of financial insolvencies at 
most nonbank corporations, including parent bank and financial holding companies, 
though not their subsidiary banks, are governed by the Federal bankruptcy code (11 
U.S.C. 101–1338). Commercial banks, as well as insurance companies and some other 
financial firms, are specifically exempted from the corporate bankruptcy code (11 USC 
109(b)(2)), (Clark, 1976).  Instead, the declaration and resolution of bank insolvencies are 
governed by the provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 
 
1 The term “bankruptcy” is derived from the Italian “banca rotta” which means broken bench and refers to 
the medieval practice of breaking a merchant’s bench in the market place when the merchant became 
insolvent (Jackson, 1986, p.1). We use the term bankruptcy in its generic sense of an insolvency 
proceeding. Strictly speaking bankruptcy applies to corporations subject to the bankruptcy code and 
following the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings by a court. For banks, “bankruptcy” occurs when the 
bank is placed into receivership or conservatorship by its chartering agency or primary federal regulator. In 
neither case is insolvency per se a necessary precondition for an “insolvency proceeding.”  See also Clark 
(1976) for alternative definitions of failure and insolvency. 
2 A review of bank insolvency codes in many foreign countries appears in Hüpkes (2000, 2003). 
21821–1825). The special code for banks differs significantly from the general federal 
corporate bankruptcy code in a number of ways enumerated in Table 1.  
The general corporate bankruptcy code in the U.S. strongly favors debtor 
corporations over their creditors and, in its Chapter 11 proceedings, which are common 
for large insolvent firms, attempted rehabilitation and in-place managers rather than 
liquidation. In contrast, the bank insolvency code favors depositors (usually the major 
class of bank creditors, and encourages speedy legal closure and resolution at the expense 
of in-place management and attempts at rehabilitation. Differences with the existing 
general corporate bankruptcy code are further widened through an emphasis on 
insolvency rather than default, formalized early intervention to forestall insolvency, quick 
declaration of insolvency when it is imminent, prompt termination of the bank charter 
and shareholder control rights, strict enforcement of creditor classes, potential speed of 
resolution, lack of creditor standing, limited judicial review, and administrative, rather 
than judicial, proceeding. The fundamentally different approaches to insolvency 
resolution of banks and non-banks derive in part from perceived differences in 
externalities of insolvencies which result in differences in the goals that these procedures 
seek to achieve.  
Section II outlines the economic and regulatory rational for a separate insolvency 
process for banks. Section III reviews the history of bank insolvency laws and procedures 
as they developed in the U.S. Section IV compares the difference in goals of nonbank 
corporate bankruptcy and bank insolvency resolution. Section V analyzes differences in a 
number of the areas used in Table 1 between the provisions in the FDI Act for banks and 
the federal bankruptcy code for general corporations. Section VI considers the issue of 
multiple jurisdictions that may arise in the failure of large and complex firms. Section VII 
concludes. 
 
II. Why a Separate Insolvency Regime for Banks? 
 Banks are exempted from the general corporate bankruptcy code and subject to 
special provisions because they are frequently viewed as “special” and different from 
other firms in their importance to the aggregate economy, in their financial fragility and 
3vulnerability, and in the seriousness of the adverse effects of their insolvency on others. 
Reasons for these perceived differences include:  
• Banks are among broadest of financial institutions and some are 
individually large relative to GDP. 
• Bank deposits (debt) are held by a large proportion of the population, 
including those of limited financial means and expertise, and in a wide 
range of denominations, including very small amounts. 
• Bank deposits collectively comprise the largest share of the country’s 
money supply and are the primary medium of exchange. 
• Banks have a large proportion of their liabilities in very short-term debt 
that can easily be withdrawn (run).  
• Bank deposits represent a significant portion of the public’s most liquid 
assets. 
• Banks are major providers of credit to households, business firms, and 
governments. 
• Banks are central to the operation of the payments system. 
• Bank assets are widely perceived to be less transparent than assets of most 
non-bank firms. 
• Ownership of bank assets can be transferred quickly and cheaply.  
• Banks are closely interconnected through inter-bank deposits and loans. 
 
Evidence clearly demonstrates that the financial health of the banking industry as 
a whole is vital to the efficient performance of the macro economy. Furthermore, 
individual bank failures, and particularly large bank failures, are widely perceived to be 
more damaging to the economy than the failure of other firms of comparable size and to 
generate particularly significant negative externalities. It is therefore argued that banks 
require special handling to reduce the societal cost of their insolvency.3 From the earliest 
days of U.S. banking, banks were required to obtain special charters from the state 
specifying their permissible activities, minimal capital requirements and requiring their 
owners to be evaluated on their moral standards. Bank charters were sometimes further 
restricted to limit competition and thus enhance safety. The potential disruptions from 
bank failures may also be reduced by tailoring the resolution process to the unique 
 
3 See inter alia Carnell (2005), Clark (1976), Corrigan (1983) and Hüpke (2000). The “banks are special” 
argument focuses primarily on the banking system as whole and individual large systemically important 
banks. Less of a case has been articulated for the special importance of individual small banks. 
4features that make their failures particularly costly. In particular, bank insolvency 
procedures attempt to reduce both credit and liquidity losses to depositors and other 
creditors by permitting—though not necessarily guaranteeing—early, quick, broad, and 
decisive actions by the delegated government regulator both when insolvency threatens 
and after the bank is declared insolvent.4 Lastly, deposit insurance is provided to protect 
targeted depositors against credit losses.  This paper discusses only the special solvency 
resolution procedures applied to banks and banking. 
Credit losses to depositors and other creditors occur when recovery values from 
the sale of the insolvent bank or its assets fall short of the par value of the creditor claims. 
Liquidity losses occur when depositors are denied immediate access to the insured par 
value or, in the case of uninsured depositors, the recovery value of their accounts. If the 
FDIC as receiver does not immediately transfer all of the deposits (insured and 
uninsured) to another bank and protect them in full as it generally did before 1992, the 
deposits may become frozen and depositor access temporarily blocked until the FDIC 
collects the proceeds from the sale of the bank’s assets. This reduces the moneyness of 
demand and other short-term deposits by effectively transforming a short-term liquid 
deposit into a time deposit of uncertain maturity. Delaying payment of the par value of 
insured deposits and expected recovery value of uninsured deposits (on demand or as 
they come due in the case of time deposits) is may produce substantial negative 
externalities in the markets served by the bank, in addition to those produced by the 
ultimately-realized credit losses (Kaufman, 2004a). 
 
III. History of the U.S. Bank Insolvency Regimes 
Bank and nonbank insolvency laws and procedures have evolved along different 
paths in the U.S. Early in U.S. history similar procedures and venues applied to both 
types of firms, but with the increase of federal involvement in the banking system the 
processes diverged.  
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States authorizes the Federal 
Government to “establish…uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies.” Nevertheless, 
 
4 As discussed below, a bank need not be economically or even book-value insolvent to be closed by 
regulators though insolvency is one possible reason for closure. We will use the term “insolvency 
resolution” for the process that follows the involuntary closing of a bank for any reason. 
5Congress was unable to enact a permanent bankruptcy code until 1898.5 When a 
permanent Federal bankruptcy statute was finally enacted, the act specifically exempted 
chartered banks.6 In this period, states dealt with the insolvency of state-chartered banks 
by suspending or not renewing their charters and appointing a receiver. For the most part, 
the resolution of insolvent state-chartered banks by states appears to have been conducted 
similarly to the resolution of non-banks.7 The bankruptcy processes were initiated by 
creditors or state officials who petitioned the courts for appointment of a receiver to 
liquidate the bank. The receiver was regarded as an officer of the court and accountable 
to it. Because insolvent banks were generally required by law to collateralize their note 
issues with specie or government bonds, note holders were typically treated as secured 
creditors. Thus, collateralization of notes was designed to protect one class of creditors, 
much as deposit insurance does today. 
Resolution of bank insolvencies appears to have been a long-standing distinct 
concern in the United States. In the 19th century most states had special provisions of one 
sort or another granting state banking regulators a role in bank insolvency resolution.8
Beginning in the early 1800s, a number of bills were introduced in Congress attempting 
to provide special bankruptcy treatment for state-chartered banks. Although not enacted, 
their introduction reflected widespread public concern about resolving bank failures, 
particularly as the banks were providing effectively all the country’s currency through 
their note issuance and the notes were in wide circulation across state lines. In 1864, 
Congress authorized the chartering of national banks. The National Bank Act also 
provided for the resolution of failed national banks by specifying that  
… on becoming satisfied … that any [national bank] association has 
refused to pay its circulating notes … and is in default, the Comptroller [of 
the Currency] may forthwith appoint a receiver … under the direction of 
the Comptroller. 
 
5 Congress passed bankruptcy codes in 1800, 1841, and 1867 which were repealed in 1803, 1843, and 
1878, respectively. The 1898 law was the first “permanent” general bankruptcy law in the U.S. (Jackson, 
1986, p.1).See also Swire (1992). 
6 Swire (1992) 
7 Upham and Lamke (1934).  
8 Upham and Lamke (1934). 
6By providing for the Comptroller rather than the courts to declare insolvency, terminate 
the bank’s charter, and appoint and direct the actions of the receiver, the Act recognized 
the need to resolve banks differently than other firms by providing for speedy 
administrative action outside the slower judicial system.9 The statutory bank receiver 
could be granted powers that other receivers were ordinarily not granted.10 The grounds 
for appointment of a receiver for national banks were broadened by Congress in 1876 to 
include operating in an unsafe and unsound manner.11 In the late 19th century, states 
began to modify their insolvency regimes for state-chartered banks in a similar fashion. 
The special statutory regimes granted state regulators a greater role in declaring a bank 
insolvent and provided for the appointment of a statutory receiver independent of the 
courts.12 
In 1933, the newly created FDIC was made the sole receiver for insolvent national 
banks and could be appointed receiver by state banking agencies for state chartered 
banks. This marked a departure from previous practice of employing private receivers 
and bankruptcy theory by appointing a major creditor as administrator/adjudicator rather 
than a financially disinterested party.13 In addition, the Comptroller was granted the 
authority to appoint the FDIC as a conservator, rather than a receiver, if it preferred to 
attempt to rehabilitate the bank, at least temporarily, as a stand-alone entity rather than 
liquidating or merging it quickly with a solvent bank.14 The 1933 act reinforced the  
 
9 A number of states adopted similar legislation for their banks, giving the state regulatory agency the 
authority to appoint and direct the operations of the receiver, although not necessarily granting the receiver 
all the powers granted by the federal statute (Swire, 1992). However, a number of states continued to 
resolve their state-chartered banks under their state bankruptcy laws (and courts) as late as 1894 (Todd, 
1994). 
10 The duties of a receiver are discussed in Upham and Lamke (1934), pp. 22-23. 
11 Upham and Lamke (1934), p. 19. 
12 Swire (1992). 
13 Provisions in Chapter 11 give management, not a disinterested party, initial control of the process, but the 
court, which has no financial interest, oversees their actions and reorganization plans are subject to 
collective creditor approval. Reasons offered for appointing the FDIC as receiver, given in Clark (1976), 
include the need to reduce losses to the insurance fund, knowledge of the banks affairs, expertise in 
financial matters, greater ability to discover insider misconduct, and need for speed and reduced cost. 
14 There are two types of conservatorships: A pass-through conservatorship that is used for technical legal 
reasons in conjunction with a receivership to facilitate the resolution of a savings institution for which there 
is no authority to charter a bridge bank. A straight conservatorship is used as a means of operating the bank 
on a temporary basis under the control of the conservator, without revoking the charter. Straight 
conservatorships have been extremely rare. 
7Comptroller’s 1876 powers to preemptively legally close banks,15 as it did not require 
explicit evidence of insolvency but only a need “…to conserve the assets of any bank for 
the benefit of the depositors and other creditors” (Todd, 1994, p.2). In 1987, the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act, granted the FDIC additional authority to charter a 
new temporary national “bridge” bank16 as an alternative to liquidation under 
receivership or administration under conservatorship to keep all or parts of insolvent 
banks operating under new FDIC-appointed management and FDIC ownership while the 
bank is resolved in an orderly manner. In both straight receivership liquidations and 
bridge banks, which are chartered after the bank is placed into receivership, the old 
bank’s charter is revoked, shareholder control interests are terminated, and typically 
senior management is changed.  
 In 1991, the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) enhanced the powers of the FDIC 
and Federal Reserve by expanding their authority as a state chartered bank’s primary 
federal regulator to legally close a state-chartered bank under their jurisdiction and 
appoint the FDIC as its statutory receiver or conservator. Previously, this power rested 
solely with the chartering state banking agency, although the FDIC could remove 
insurance coverage. FDICIA also expanded and strengthened the powers of the primary 
federal regulators to legally close a bank beyond the previously legislated causes of 
finding of insufficient assets to meet its obligations, unsafe and unsound banking 
practices, or threatened losses that would deplete the bank’s capital. Included as part of 
the newly enacted prompt corrective action (PCA) provisions (12 USC 1831o), the new 
criterion affirmatively requires (rather than merely permitting) the appropriate regulators 
to appoint a receiver or conservator within 90 days (and allowing for two 90-day 
extensions) of a finding that a bank’s book value tangible equity capital has declined and 
remained below the “critically undercapitalized” ratio to a bank’s total assets. This ratio 
is currently set by the bank regulators at the two percent minimum prescribed in the 
 
15 Bank “closure” refers to termination of the bank’s charter and placing it into receivership. It does not 
necessarily mean that the bank is physically closed and ceases operations, any more than bankruptcy means 
that a nonbank corporation ceases doing business. However, historically, bank closures usually resulted in 
physical closure and liquidation.  
16 A bridge bank is a newly chartered national bank, frequently under a similar name, owned and operated 
by the FDIC, to which some or all of the bank’s assets and liabilities are effectively transferred when the 
bank is closed. The life of a bridge bank is statutorily limited to two years, with two 1-year extensions 
permitted. 
8legislation. Thus, a bank need not be book-value insolvent or predicted to be so in order 
to be considered regulatorily insolvent and placed into receivership.17 Among other 
things, this provision reduced the discretion of bank regulators to decide when to appoint 
receivers (“forbearance”), which often resulted in closure delays at a cost of continuing, 
if not worsening, the insolvent bank’s losses. These provisions, designed to precipitate 
resolution before an actual event of economic insolvency or financial default, mark 
another important departure from corporate bankruptcy law and provides regulators, 
including the FDIC, with a powerful tool for mitigating losses to creditors. 
 Lastly, in 1993, the Depositor Preference Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)) modified 
the priority of payment of claims on insolvent banks to give priority to domestic deposits, 
generally those payable at the bank’s domestic offices, over other types of deposits18 and 
other creditors (though behind tax liabilities, unpaid wages, and administrative costs 
incurred by the FDIC in administering the resolution). The FDIC, standing in the shoes of 
insured depositors, was put on an equal basis with the uninsured domestic depositors and 
ahead of general creditors.  
 
IV. Goals of Bankruptcy 
 As noted earlier, banks and general corporations are subject to different 
bankruptcy codes because the goals of resolving insolvencies differ for the two types of 
firms. The goals of corporate bankruptcy are not explicitly spelled out in the code. 
Different scholars have defined them in various ways. Common elements in these 
definitions include solutions of a collective action problem—coordinating the debt 
collection efforts of multiple creditors to maximize overall recovery value (Jackson, 
1986); maximizing the realized value of the bankrupt firm’s assets (Hüpkes, 2000); 
 
17 If a bank is resolved at a gain to the FDIC after making all depositors and other creditors whole, the 
excess is paid to the old shareholders. 
18 The legal definition of “deposit” is specified in the FDI Act (12 USC 1813(l)(5)(A)) and regulatory 
interpretation, and is broadly limited to deposits payable at domestic offices (branches and subsidiaries 
located in the U.S.). Deposits payable only at foreign offices are generally excluded as are some types of 
deposits at domestic offices, for instance International Deposit Facilities. See Curtis (2000) for a full 
discussion. For ease of exposition, we will refer to those deposits that qualify for deposit insurance (up to 
allowed limits) and under depositor preference as “domestic deposits” or simply “deposits,” those deposits 
that do not qualify we subsume under the term “foreign deposits.” 
9distributing the assets equitably to the creditors19 (Hüpkes, 2000), if it is determined that 
the firm should be liquidated (U.S. Chapter 7); or restoring the firm to financial solvency 
by renegotiating creditor claims, if it is determined that the firm has “going concern 
value” and creditors as a group would be better off if the firm is restructured rather than 
liquidated (U.S. Chapter 11). 
 In contrast, since FDICIA the goal of bank insolvency resolution is explicit. It is 
to achieve a resolution, subject to the legally-mandated creditor priorities, that “is the 
least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible methods” (12 USC 
1823(c)(4)(A)(ii)). This is referred to as “least cost resolution.” In pursuit of this goal, the 
FDIC is required to “maximize the net present value return from the sale” of assets (12 
USC 1823(d)(3)(D) (i)). Because the FDIC and uninsured domestic depositors have equal 
priority, achieving least cost resolution for the FDIC also achieves least cost to 
(uninsured domestic) depositors. 
 Banking law traditionally considers the impact of bank resolution, not only on the 
bank’s creditors, but also on the local economy and financial markets more broadly, 
while bankruptcy procedures focus more narrowly on the interests of creditors, managers, 
and stockholders. Thus, the bank insolvency code is more concerned with adverse 
externalities for the general community. For example, under FDICIA, the FDIC may, 
under restrictive conditions, bypass the least cost resolution requirement if adhering to it, 
and imposing losses on uninsured depositors and other creditors, “would have serious 
adverse effects on economic conditions and financial stability and any action or 
assistance … would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects” (12 USC 1823(c)(4)(G)). 
This is referred to as the “systemic risk exemption” (Kaufman, 2004b). Likewise, in asset 
sales, the FDIC is directed to “…fully consider adverse economic impact…” (12 USC  
 
19 “Equitably” means according to legally defined priorities and within the priority classes on a pro rata 
basis, taking into account valid security interests (collateral) and contractual subordination agreements (e.g. 
subordinated debentures). Most creditors, including secured creditors (to the extent that their claims exceed 
the liquidated value of their collateral), fall into the “general creditor” class. See Bhandari and Weiss 
(1996) for a collection of articles on this and related issues in the economics of bankruptcy. 
10   
1821(h)(1)). No comparable concern for the impact of insolvency resolution on third 
parties appears in bankruptcy law.20 
To minimize the impact on the economy, bank insolvency law requires speedy 
initiation of legal closure, but permits keeping distressed banks in business temporarily 
through an FDIC conservatorship in order to rehabilitate them. However, such 
conservatorships are currently rarely used. Today, bridge banks (12 USC 1821(n)) 
provide a more frequently used alternate means of keeping a legally closed bank 
effectively operating while the final disposition is being worked out. Most corporate 
bankruptcies are liquidations (Chapter 7), but large bankruptcies are, at least initially, 
Chapter 11 administrations, initially under the control of existing (pre-filing) 
management. Thus, banking law places an emphasis on minimizing immediate losses to 
the FDIC and depositors through prompt initiation of legal closure and resolution 
primarily through liquidation; while corporate bankruptcy is more likely to weigh 
perceived long-term going-concern value.21 That is, banks, even large banks, have their 
charter revoked when they are placed into receivership and the bank per se disappears as 
a stand-alone entity; on the other hand corporations that file under Chapter 11 generally 
attempt to survive under their own name on a stand-alone basis. 
 
V. Differences in Code Provisions 
The statutes governing bankruptcy and bank insolvency resolution in the U.S. differ in 
many ways, some of which are detailed in Table 1. This section examines a number of 
the salient areas.22 
20 The failure of corporate bankruptcy procedures to explicitly consider externalities does not necessarily 
reflect an implicit belief that corporate failures do not engender significant externalities—occasional 
government bailouts of large “critical” corporations, protective trade policies, and recurring news stories of 
the impact of the failure of major employers on local economies, suggests otherwise. A more likely 
explanation lies in the origin of corporate bankruptcy law in common law with its emphasis on parties “in 
interest” with legal standing (hence an emphasis on debtor and creditor and not employees, suppliers, let 
alone local communities). Bank insolvency procedures, in contrast, have their origins in regulatory policy 
with a clearer focus on markets and economic effects. 
21 In cases where an insolvent bank is quickly sold and reopens under a new name, it may be argued that 
little going concern value is lost 
22 A comparison of banking law with that for government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) appears in Carnell 
(2005). 
11   
A. Initiation of Bankruptcy 
 Most nonbank corporations are subject to the Federal Bankruptcy Code (11 USC 
109(b) defines who is “a debtor”). Involuntary bankruptcy may be initiated either by a 
minimum number of creditors, whose claims are in default, or voluntarily by the firm 
itself in anticipation of a default or for strategic reasons.23 In either case, a petition is 
made to one of a number of regional federal bankruptcy courts. Court approval of the 
creditors’ petition or merely filing a voluntary petition initiates the process.  
Unlike corporate bankruptcy law, where either creditors or management may 
initiate the process, bank resolution is initiated exogenously by the chartering agency or 
the institution’s primary federal regulatory agency, or the FDIC.24 The decision is based 
on one or more reasons enumerated in the FDI Act (12 USC 1821(c)(5)), for example, if 
the relevant authority believes that the bank is not being operated in a safe and sound 
manner, and that the bank is unlikely to meet its deposit obligations. Perhaps the most 
significant of the reasons for bank closure, since the passage of FDICIA in 1991, is 
becoming “critically undercapitalized” while the bank is still book value solvent, defined 
as a minimum of two percent equity capital to total assets, and possibly even market 
value solvent.25 Thus, the mandatory “critically undercapitalized” criterion serves as a 
backstop intended to prevent regulators from delaying closing a bank for other 
discretionary prudential reasons. 
Once legally closed, the bank’s charter is revoked by the chartering agency and it 
is passed on to the FDIC, who serves as receiver or conservator. The old bank’s senior 
managers are typically ousted and shareholder control rights are terminated, although 
 
23 Examples of strategic motives include fixing open-ended tort claims (e.g. asbestos litigation), 
restructuring labor contracts, and off-loading pension and health plans. Bankruptcy may be also be used to 
sell a firm free and clear of potential claims arising from pre-sale events. 
24 Chartering agencies are the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for nationally chartered banks, state bank 
regulator agencies for state chartered banks and thrift institutions, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
(OTS) for federal thrift institutions. Primary Federal regulators are the OCC for nationally chartered banks, 
the Federal Reserve for state chartered member banks, the FDIC for state chartered non-Federal Reserve 
member banks, or the OTS for federal thrifts. The FDIC may also appoint itself conservator or receiver (12 
USC 1821(c)(4)). 
25 Thus, there are three distinct forms of insolvency: book-value insolvency defined by book values 
determined according to appropriate accounting standards; regulatory insolvency, also defined in terms of 
book values but set at a higher threshold; and economic insolvency, determined by the market value of 
assets and face value of liabilities. 
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shareholders maintain a claim on any residual value remain after creditors’ claims are 
satisfied. 
No such anticipatory initiation of insolvency proceedings is available under the 
corporate bankruptcy laws.26 However, solvent non-bank institutions (as well as banks) 
which rely heavily on short term financing, are subject to liquidity crises that may 
precipitate economic insolvency if markets believe that a solvent institution is insolvent. 
Creditors can also write acceleration clauses into debt and derivatives contracts that are 
triggered short of insolvency and default (e.g. “due on downgrade” clauses).27 
Acceleration, like withdrawal of short term credit, can induce a liquidity crisis leading to 
actual default and insolvency. The downside of runs and acceleration as bankruptcy 
initiation devices is that in response to a creditor demands to liquidate claims an 
institution may engage in forced liquidation of assets at fire sale prices in an effort to 
avoid default, thus destroying value. However, management does have the alternative of 
voluntary filing of bankruptcy if it wishes.28 Thus, while creditors cannot legally initiate 
insolvency procedures without an act of default (as bank regulators can), efforts by 
creditors to withdraw short-term credit or accelerate claims may achieve the same result.  
B. Stays 
The ability to temporarily prevent creditors from pursuing their claims (termed 
“stays”) is central to the corporate bankruptcy process. Stays permit the bankruptcy court 
“call time out” to collect and validate claims, to determine the best way to dispose of 
assets in an orderly, value-maximizing manner, and to treat all like-priority creditors 
equally. Stays prevent creditor runs and keep contracts in force—the counter party is 
bound by the contract; claims on the insolvent firm remain pending; and collateral may 
usually not be liquidated. This facilitates the coordination of creditor claims. The ability 
of bankruptcy courts to impose stays on most creditor claims is explicit in the corporate 
bankruptcy code. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, the ability of courts to stay contracts is 
 
26 Creditors may write clauses into their contracts that are triggered short of insolvency and default (e.g. 
due on downgrade clause), and these may in turn trigger a default precipitating the bankruptcy filing.  
27 These clauses require immediate termination of the contract and payment in full if contractually 
stipulated “credit events” occur. These credit triggers, such as minimum working capital ratios or minimum 
debt ratings, are designed to terminate contracts in advance of insolvency. 
28 Voluntary filing is possible for both banks and non-banks. It is more common for large non-banks, in part 
because it preserves management control. It is rare for banks since management is usually replaced 
immediately. 
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crucial for the firm to preserve productive capacity (assets), while creditor claims are 
being renegotiated. 
Under the FDI Act, the FDIC’s ability to stay is limited to requesting a maximum 
stay of 60 days of judicial actions (law suits) to which the closed bank is a party or 
becomes a party.29 The request must be honored by the courts. However, the FDI Act 
contains no general power to stay contracts, including deposit contracts. In particular, the 
FDIC cannot keep contracts in force while preventing counter parties from exercising 
their rights under those contracts. Thus, unlike bankruptcy courts, the FDIC cannot stay 
“self-help remedies” such as liquidation of collateral, for most contracts.30 However, the 
FDIC as receiver has broad powers to disaffirm or repudiate contracts (12 USC 
1821(e)(1)) within “a reasonable time” (12 USC 1821(e)(2)). As they cannot compel 
performance under the repudiated contract, the effected counter parties remedies are 
limited to ex post damages (12 USC 1821(e)(3)). Unlike the general corporate 
bankruptcy stay that keeps contracts in place, this procedure is more akin to the close-out 
mechanism found in derivatives contracts.31 When FDIC terminates a contract, it creates 
a claim that has the status of a general creditor.  
Certain qualified financial contracts (e.g., derivatives master agreements, see 
Bergman et al, 2004) are exempt from the stays that apply to most contracts under the 
corporate bankruptcy code. These derivative master agreements contain close-out 
provisions which, when triggered, allow the solvent counter party to immediately 
terminate the contract (and all transactions under the master agreement), net the values, 
and pay the net amount due or file a claim if the net amount is owed.32 However, these 
rights are not immediately enforceable for banks placed unto receivership or 
conservatorship. The FDIC has the power to prevent close-out for one business day in the 
case of receivership and indefinitely in the case of conservatorship or for contracts that 
are transferred to a bridge bank, for virtually any reason excepting non-performance 
 
29 12 USC 1823(c)(2)(C) and Simmons (2001). 
30 Simmons (2001). 
31 See Bergman et al (2004). 
32 The benefits and disadvantages of this exemption to the usual staying of contracts during an insolvency 
proceeding are discussed in Bliss and Kaufman (2006b). 
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(default or failure to meet collateral calls).33 Thus, while most contracts, with the 
exception of qualified financial contracts, are automatically stayed by courts in the event 
of a corporate bankruptcy, the opposite situation obtains in the event of a bank’s 
insolvency. 
C. Management of the Insolvency Process 
 Corporate bankruptcies are resolved in special federal bankruptcy courts. The 
proceedings are judicial in nature with each party being represented by its own lawyers. 
The court appoints an agent to co-ordinate the process. For a liquidation this agent would 
be a receiver and for reorganization, a trustee. In Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, 
the insolvent corporation’s senior management is usually allowed by the court to continue 
operating the company and has exclusive rights to formulate a reorganization plan during 
an exclusion period of 120 days. The bankruptcy court may, at its discretion, grant 
extensions of this period and has routinely done so in the past.34 Creditors may, however, 
petition the court to appoint an independent trustee under certain circumstances. All 
creditors have “standing” to be represented in the proceedings, although the dynamics of 
voting may lead to certain minority blocks being effectively frozen out. Each creditor 
group, and in reorganizations also management and shareholders, must vote to approve 
the plans proposed by management, receiver, or trustee.35 Decisions undertaken during 
the course of the proceedings (e.g., releasing collateral to secured creditors, partial 
payment of claims, paying employees, new post-insolvency—debtor-in-possession 
(DIP)—borrowing) are taken by the receiver/trustee with the approval of the court (the 
 
33 An important question concerns the status of in-the-money qualified financial contracts transferred to a 
bridge or other bank or kept in force in a conservatorship. The FDIC may effectively guarantee the values 
of these contracts (which will continue to fluctuate in response to changes in value of the underlying 
sources of risk), thus removing the element of credit risk from these contracts if they are not disavowed 
(and permitted to close-out) within the stipulated one business day. It is not clear how this would be 
squared with least cost resolution without requiring that the systemic risk exemption be invoked, a 
complicated and potentially time consuming process, since the derivatives counter parties, who are 
technically subordinated to domestic depositors, would in effect receive full value on their positions. 
34 It is not unusual for large Chapter 11 proceedings to remain under management control for several years, 
e.g., United Airlines remained in bankruptcy for some three years before emerging in February 2006 under 
new ownership. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 now limits 
extensions of the exclusion period to 18 months for filing a management plan and 20 months for approving 
such a plan. 
35 Voting is done by creditor classes. Classes are determined by the court with the intention that all 
members of a class have similar interests (priority, security interests, etc). Voting within creditor classes is 
by claim amount and number of creditors. One large creditor cannot freeze out other members of the class, 
nor can one small creditor “hold up” the other members of the class.  
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judge overseeing the case). Some decisions taken by the court, for instance granting 
extensions of the exclusion period to allow management to remain in control, may not be 
in the interests of all existing creditors. However, major decisions, such as approval of a 
reorganization plan, are subject to unanimous agreement by all creditor classes. If a plan 
is voted down, the parties continue to seek agreement, possibly under a new 
receiver/trustee. Eventually, if the parties cannot agree the court can “cram down” the 
plan that it considers most equitable. Decisions undertaken by the bankruptcy court may 
be appealed to higher courts, and many decisions are litigated before they finally take 
effect.36 
In contrast, bank insolvencies are handled in an administrative proceeding. The 
bank’s charter is revoked and shareholder control interests are terminated by the bank’s 
primary regulator, and senior management is removed by the FDIC as receiver or 
conservator, all without involvement of any court.37 Following its appointment as 
receiver or conservator, FDIC is solely in charge. As receiver or conservator, the FDIC 
collects information from the bank, its depositors, and other creditors, determines the 
validity of claims and then, within the confines of the law and its own regulations, 
disposes of the assets and pays off or transfers the liabilities. The FDIC unilaterally 
makes all decisions necessary to carry out the liquidation or reorganization. No separate 
oversight authority—equivalent to the court/trustee relationship—exists. Furthermore, 
once the receiver or conservator is appointed, there is no mechanism for creditors, 
management, or shareholders to participate in the decision making process beyond the 
filing of claims and the provision of requested information. In effect, claimants have no 
standing and very limited rights to appeal decisions before they are executed. However, 
some decisions of the FDIC are subject to ex post judicial review, although damages are 
 
36 A bankruptcy court typically rules on numerous intermediate matters (for instance, the choice of a trustee 
or disposition of assets). The parties may then choose to appeal these rulings, during which time the court 
may stay its own ruling until the appeals are resolved. 
37 One exception, however, is that the FDI Act grants the directors of a bank 30 days following self-
appointment of the FDIC as conservator or receiver in which to file an appeal (12 USC 1821(c)(7)). This 
right appears to have been rarely exercised and never successfully. No right of appeal exists for a primary 
regulator-initiated bank closure. 
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the only available remedy. Other decisions, for instance to disallow creditor claims, are 
not subject to judicial review.38 (12 USC 1821(d)(5)(E)). 
D. Priorities, Collateral, and Offsets 
Legal priority, security interests, and right of offset, where protected, jointly 
determine what a creditor is entitled to under the law.39 Both bankruptcy law and the FDI 
Act provide a list of priorities specifying the order in which creditors should be paid off 
(11 USC 507(a) and 12 USC 1821(d)(11)(A)). In both cases, the costs of administering 
the insolvency come first. These costs can be very substantial in the case of corporate 
insolvencies. Bris et al (2004) report the mean (median) ratio of total direct expenses—
including attorneys’, accountants’ and trustee’s fees—as a percentage of reported assets 
at time of filing to be 8.15% (2.50%) for Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 16.9% (2.00%) for 
Chapter 11 proceedings.40 The bankruptcy code lists a number of unsecured creditor 
classes that receive favored or priority status (11 USC 507(a)). However, except for taxes 
(and for bank and financial holding companies, agreements with regulators), these are 
likely to be of little practical importance. The large majority of unsecured corporate 
creditors are lumped together as general creditors.41 In Chapter 11 proceedings, creditors 
are generally paid in securities of the reorganized firm, often in more junior securities.  
In 1993, the Depositor Preference Act created a large, special class of senior 
creditors, namely domestic depositors, including the FDIC through its subrogation of the 
insured depositors’ claims are given priority over other unsecured general creditors.42 
Insured depositors are paid in full by the FDIC, which steps into their shoes and assumes 
 
38 These powers, which go far beyond those enjoyed by a bankruptcy trustee or court, have been termed 
“super powers” by Baxter, Hansen, and Sommer (2004). 
39 “Priority” refers to the order in which various unsecured creditor classes are paid to be off from the assets 
of the bankruptcy estate. “Security interest” refers to liens on property that reduce the assets available to the 
estate; collateral being a common example. “Offset” is the process of combining (netting) offsetting 
multiple contracts between the insolvent firm and a given counterparty to reduce both the assets available 
to the estate (amounts owed by the counterparty) and unsecured claims against the estate (amounts owed to 
the same counterparty); bank loans and deposits are an example. 
40 Costs can be large in absolute numbers as well. In the Chapter 11 reorganization of United Airlines 
which lasted from 2002 to 2006, legal and consulting costs exceeded $300 million 
41 A number of creditors have subordinated claims. These include subordinated debenture. However, such 
subordination is contractual rather than statutory. The default priority for creditors under the Bankruptcy 
Code is “general creditor.” 
42 A number of states had previously provided for depositor preference in their banking legislation, which 
applied to state-charter banks that were resolved under state laws (Kaufman, 1997). State laws, which 
govern insurance company insolvencies, frequently grant policy holders priority over other creditors. 
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(subrogates) their claims. Uninsured domestic depositors and the FDIC share equally (on 
a pro rata basis) in any recoveries, up to the par amount of the deposit liabilities. Any 
excess recoveries are distributed to general creditors, and then to shareholders (including 
parent company equity interests).43 Because of depositor preference, general creditors of 
banks usually recovered a smaller percentage of their claims than general creditors at 
non-bank firms.44 
Commercial law provides mechanisms for creditors to establish security interests 
in the property of the debtor through collateralization of their claims. If the proper legal 
forms have been followed, bankruptcy courts will enforce these rights. Thus, secured 
general creditors may enjoy higher recoveries than would unsecured creditors. Banking 
law discourages collateral arrangements on the part of a bank’s depositors. In the U.S., 
generally only U.S. Treasury, state, and municipal governments can secure their deposits 
with collateral. Non-deposit creditors (including foreign depositors) have greater 
opportunity to secure their claims through collateralization, repurchase agreements, etc. 
Federal Reserve lending through the discount window is also fully collateralized. 
During Chapter 11 rehabilitation, the bankrupt firm can contract, with the court’s 
permission, for additional debtor in possession (DIP) financing to allow it to continue 
operating.  This new debt is effectively given priority over the existing, pre-bankruptcy 
debt.45 Such borrowing may reduce ultimate payments to existing creditors, if economic 
firm value continues to be eroded. While there is no external (financial market) DIP 
financing for banks, pre-closure financing in the form of Federal Reserve discount 
 
43 Nearly all large commercial banks in the U.S. are currently fully owned subsidiaries of bank or financial 
holding companies. 
44 In recent years, it is rare that general creditors have recovered anything in bank insolvencies. However, 
recent banks failures which have been small, with few non-domestic deposit claims and usually structurally 
simple (NextBank and Superior were small but complex banks). It would be hazardous to extrapolate from 
this evidence how general creditors in a large complex bank resolution might compare with general 
creditors in comparable-size corporate reorganizations. 
45 Most DIP financing of ongoing regular business expenses (e.g., wages) is classified as “administration 
expenses” and thus enjoys the senior priority that the law awards such costs (in both bank and general 
corporate insolvencies) over other unsecured creditors. Under such terms, banks are frequently willing to 
provide working capital to Chapter 11 insolvencies. It is also possible, though rare, for courts to award DIP 
financing a senior secured status displacing previous secured creditors. Bankruptcy procedures, though they 
may not always be successful, are designed to ensure that post-filing lending is not employed to obtain 
preferential recoveries on pre-filing debt.  
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window lending and FDIC-provided open bank assistance have in the past served much 
the same purpose.46 
While corporate bankruptcy law generally frowns on offsets—the canceling of 
reciprocal obligations to arrive at a net amount to be owed or claimed—both the courts 
and the FDIC support offset for bank loans and deposits. A solvent bank depositor can 
offset an uninsured deposit he or she is owed by an insolvent bank against a performing 
loan it owes to that bank up to an equal face value. This protects the value of the 
uninsured deposit and avoids having it treated as a general creditor claim subject to loss. 
For corporations subject to the bankruptcy code, reciprocal contracts are generally treated 
separately and are not offset. Amounts owed by solvent counterparties must be paid as 
they come due, even though the same party may be owed funds from the insolvent 
counterparty; the solvent counterparty becomes a general creditor for amounts it is owed 
and subject to losses. However, non-bank firms are less likely than banks to have 
significant numbers of reciprocal creditor/debtor contracts. Only offset of qualified 
financial contracts, e.g. many derivatives under master agreements, is supported for both 
banks and non-banks. 
E. Legal Certainty of Claims 
The dynamics of the corporate bankruptcy process increases the uncertainties as 
to both the value and timing of creditor recoveries. The straightforward priorities of 
payoff under bankruptcy law only apply in liquidation. An essential element of corporate 
reorganization is that creditors participate in a renegotiation of their claims, the outcome 
of which, while subject to collective approval, may depend as much on bargaining power 
of the different claimants as on their theoretical priorities in liquidation. Furthermore, 
security interests may lead to apparent, if not real, redistribution between theoretically 
 
46 Since distressed bank financing by regulators is fully collateralized, the risk of reduced recoveries by 
uninsured depositors, and indeed the FDIC itself, is present in such efforts to avoid insolvency. Both 
discount window lending and open bank assistance are intended to keep a bank viable while it is returned to 
financial health, as DIP financing is intended to allow a non-bank corporation to attempt to return to 
financial health. 
Insofar as the financing of a firm that is experiencing operating losses delays the resolution and 
erodes the recoveries by creditors, the distinction between post-filing financing (DIP) and pre-closure 
financing (discount lending, open bank assistance) is not material to analyzing whether the efforts to 
rehabilitate a firm that these mechanism make possible are in the creditors’ interests. In both, cases it is not 
the post-distress credit providers that bear the consequences. In both cases the danger lies in the possibility 
that the firm may in fact not be viable and that delays facilitated by these financing mechanisms will further 
erode value. 
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equal-priority creditors. The corporate bankruptcy process, with its use of class voting 
and the possibility of junior holdouts, may also reduce at least the present value of the 
aggregate final recovery value. This frequently leads to dynamics where more senior 
creditors give up part of their legal claim in the hopes of achieving a settlement that 
yields a larger present value recovery (smaller, more immediate portion of a bigger, or at 
least more certain, pie). Leaving aside the possibilities that claims will be disallowed for 
various reasons, the precise distributional outcome of reorganization under bankruptcy is 
uncertain.  
Bank insolvencies generally do not suffer from this problem. Offset and collateral 
are usually not major issues (particularly, for small and medium banks), and depositor 
preference is usually adhered to.47 Absolute priority may be violated in bank insolvencies 
only under two conditions. Firstly, if the systemic risk exemption is invoked and some 
general creditors are made whole, while uninsured depositors and the FDIC are not. 
Secondly, if least cost resolution is achieved by transferring some non-insured deposit 
liabilities—for instance complex financial contracts—to a bridge bank rather than 
liquidating them, thus protecting those creditors from the credit losses that other creditors 
may incur. Neither of these two conditions is likely to occur frequently, but both are more 
likely to occur in large bank failures.  
Despite the fact that the PCA closure rules are stated in terms of a positive 
minimum equity level, the superimposition of depositor preference on least cost 
resolution  may have made foreign depositors and unsecured general creditors less certain 
about their recovery amounts than domestic depositors. Because the FDIC has equal 
priority with domestic depositors and is senior to other creditors, the general creditors’ 
funds operate as a buffer against its losses (effectively “capital”).48 To the extent the law 
requires that regulators operate to minimize losses only to the deposit insurance fund, 
depositor preference may unintentionally provide them an incentive to be less aggressive 
in legally closing insolvent banks within the discretion available to them under PCA, and 
the FDIC may be less assiduous in disposing of assets of closed banks in the most 
 
47 The insolvency resolution of Superior Bank, which failed in 2001, may be a possible exception. The 
FDIC negotiated with the previous owners of the failed bank to share the part of the proceeds of litigation 
against the bank’s auditors, Ernst and Young, arguing that this would result in a higher total recovery, 
rather than paying all the proceeds to the uninsured depositors. See Johnson (2005). 
48 See discussion in Kaufman (1997). 
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efficient manner. Thus, non-domestic depositors and other creditors have an incentive to 
run or collateralize their claims. These incentives are an unintended consequence of 
superimposing depositor preference on FDICIA, rather than a deliberate policy decision. 
Another major uncertainty in some bank insolvencies surrounds the ability of 
banking regulators to extract assets from the parent holding company for the benefit of 
the closed bank’s depositors (including the FDIC) and general creditors under the Federal 
Reserve’s “source of strength” doctrine (see Section VI below). 
F. Timeliness 
 The timeliness of insolvency resolution has two components: the ability to initiate 
the process before the potential credit losses to debt claimants become large, and the 
ability to resolve the insolvency and pay the depositors and other creditors the recovery 
values of their claims in an expeditious manner once it is initiated minimizing liquidity 
losses. Prompt legal closure deprives shareholders and managers of the option to gamble 
for resurrection at the depositors’ and creditors’ expense and minimizes credit losses, 
while prompt resolution mitigates both credit losses, if asset values decline after 
insolvency has been declared, and liquidity losses to depositors and creditors, who have 
their funds tied up in the insolvent bank. 
As was noted earlier, there is no mechanism for non-bank corporate creditors to 
preemptively precipitate a bankruptcy proceeding so as to limit their losses except in 
some instances through runs and acceleration, both of which may also exacerbate the 
losses. Absent such creditor-precipitated liquidity crisis, creditors must await an event of 
default that permits them a basis for petitioning the court to place the firm into 
bankruptcy. So long as firms can meet current financial obligations, including through 
asset liquidations, there is little that creditors can do even if the firm is believed to be 
insolvent. Managers can and sometimes do file for bankruptcy, usually Chapter 11, in 
anticipation of an actual default. However, in such a voluntary action the managers may 
not always be acting solely in the creditor’s interests. On the other hand, bank regulators 
have broad powers to legally close a bank on the basis that it may get into financial 
trouble (i.e., operating in an unsafe and unsound manner) and a positive requirement to 
close it before it becomes book-value insolvent. However, when a bank becomes 
financially distressed, bank book values are likely to exceed market or economic values 
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by increasing amounts and regulators may be unaware of the true economic solvency of a 
bank until it is well and truly economically insolvent, particularly for small banks. 
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that in most instances banks are resolved with 
proportionally smaller losses relative to combined depositors’ and other creditors’ claims 
than to creditors’ claims in corporate bankruptcies, both before and after the 
establishment of the FDIC.49 
Once initiated, the FDIC as receiver can move with self-determined speed and has 
done so in the past. The bank may be sold immediately, generally over the first weekend, 
in part or whole; converted into a temporary bridge bank; and/or liquidated more slowly 
through time. More recently, banks have been kept in receivership while the assets are 
sold.50 
The FDI Act recognizes the special character of bank deposit claims, specifically 
that because of their liquidity they serve as money. Thus, the FDI Act requires that 
“payment of the insured deposits…shall be made by the Corporation [FDIC] as soon as 
possible” (12 USC 1821(f)) and authorizes the FDIC “to settle all uninsured and 
unsecured claims with a final settlement payment” based on average past recovery values 
in order “to maintain essential liquidity and to prevent financial disruption” (12 USC 
1821(d)(4)(B)). The FDIC also has the authority to make advance dividend payments to 
claimants based on its estimates of recovery values for the bank being resolved.51 Like 
the prompt payment of insured deposits, advanced dividends on uninsured deposits 
minimize liquidity losses. However, advanced dividends are likely to be less than par 
value, so that the uninsured claimants may suffer credit losses, at least initially. Thus, 
because of the prompt payment of insured depositors at par and the potential for 
accelerated payment of the expected recovery value of uninsured deposits, liquidity 
issues are potentially separate from the time in receivership.  
Except for insured depositors, whose claims are usually settled immediately by 
transferring the deposits to another bank and are made immediately available, both 
 
49 Bris et al (2004) and Kaufman (1994). 
50 The ability of the FDIC to sell the bank quickly may have been constrained by the least cost resolution of 
FDICIA, in combination with the relatively greater importance of fraud in small bank failures which makes 
it difficult to arrange whole bank transfers at a loss to the FDIC. Purchase and assumption, which used to 
be common, now appears to be rare. 
51 The FDIC is also empowered to pay advanced dividends to uninsured claimants based on past average 
recovery values rather than expected recovery values (12 USC 1821(4)(B)(iii)), but has not done so.  
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uninsured depositors and other creditors, once their claims have been approved by the 
FDIC are given receivership certificates. These are paid in cash as this becomes available 
through sale of assets, or earlier through the aforementioned advanced dividends. The 
timing and amount of any dividends are determined by the FDIC and may be spread over 
several months or years.  Liquidation of a bank’s assets, once it is has been legally 
closed, is not immediate and asset values may deteriorate as they do in Chapter 11 
proceedings.52 
Prior to FDICIA it was common practice to use purchase and assumption to 
resolve bank failures. This process transferred all of the insolvent bank’s assets and 
liabilities to an acquiring bank, usually over a weekend. This ensured liquidity for all 
creditors, but at the cost of indiscriminately bailing all of them out at par value, 
undermining market discipline, and potentially exacerbating moral hazard. Following the 
introduction of least cost resolution, purchase and assumption transactions became 
infrequent. For a brief period of time in the early 1980s, the FDIC used its powers to pay 
advanced dividend payments to holders of receivership certificates, thus providing a 
measure of liquidity and maintaining the ability to impose credit losses. Since the 
introduction of FDICIA in 1991, the FDIC has paid advanced dividends progressively 
less frequently and has relied more on regular dividends.  In the absence of advanced 
dividends, the FDIC pays out “traditional” dividends on remaining claims as it liquidates 
assets, the proceeds of which are shared first by the FDIC and the uninsured depositors, 
followed, after all domestic depositor claims have been paid in full, by general creditors 
(including foreign depositors), and finally shareholders. These dividends, which depend 
on the progress of the resolution, may be spread over a number of years. This has caused 
liquidity losses, but the involved banks have been comparatively small and the adverse 
effects have usually been limited to the local economy.53 
Delays in payment to uninsured depositors have sometimes been substantial. 
There is substantial variation around the average length of time the bank is in FDIC 
 
52 It is important to remember that delay does not necessarily produce asset value erosion, though egregious 
examples of loss of value in some FDIC resolutions (e.g., NextBank in 200?) and during Chapter 11 
proceedings focuses the attention on that possibility. Rapid liquidation of assets under adverse market 
conditions or without proper incentives to maximize value can be similarly deleterious to the welfare of 
creditors. 
53 A history of attempts to deal with liquidity losses in the resolution of bank insolvencies in the U.S. 
appears in Kaufman (2004a). 
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receivership and the timeliness of bank insolvency resolution and payment of depositors 
appears to have changed over time. Of the 24 bank insolvencies between 2000 and 2005: 
• One bank was sold immediately 
• Four banks have paid final dividends (two in less than 6 months, two after 
more than 2 years). 
• The remaining 19 banks (apparently) remain unresolved after periods ranging 
from 6 to 50 months (the mean is 28 months). 
All 19 have paid intermediate dividends. The mean time from legal closure to first 
dividend was 4.4 months, and the mean dividend amount was 54%.  
In corporate bankruptcy there is no immediate resolution, and the average length 
of time the firm is in Chapter 7 or 11 may be long and variable (See Bris et al, 2004). 
Creditor liquidity in corporate bankruptcy is tied more closely to the time spent in 
bankruptcy than in bank insolvency resolutions as there are only limited arrangements for 
payments to creditors before proceeds are received from the sale of assets or approval of 
the reorganization plan.54 Thus, the final resolution of banks may be faster than for non-
banks, but need not be, and for domestic depositors, bank insolvency usually provides 
some recovery prior to the final resolution. 
 
VI.  Multiple Jurisdictions 
Both bankruptcy and bank insolvency laws and procedures reflect an implicit 
assumption that a single venue (court or administrative proceeding) is resolving a single 
firm. This is true for most small firms and small banks. However, single firm/single 
venue is unlikely to apply for large multinational firms and financial institutions. The 
resulting multiplicity of jurisdictions is likely to reduce the efficiency and increase the 
cost of failure resolution.55 The involvement of multiple jurisdictions in the insolvency 
resolution of a single firm can arise for two reasons: international operations and 
 
54 A market may exist for bonds and perhaps equity of firms in bankruptcy, allowing those creditors to sell 
their claims and realize their current market value. No pre-existing market currently exists for insolvent 
bank receivership certificates. 
55 See Bliss (2006) for a full discussion. 
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organizational structure.56 In both cases, the operation of parallel, sometimes adversarial, 
proceedings can lead to complexities, with creditors bearing the resulting costs.57 
Multinational firms, be they banks or non-banks, are subject to multiple 
jurisdictions when they fail. There are two approaches to this problem: to treat the firm as 
a single entity and to have one court take the lead in guiding the resolution (the universal 
approach) or for each jurisdiction to conduct separate proceedings using the assets under 
its control for the benefit of local creditors (the territorial approach). 
Recent revisions to the U.S. corporate bankruptcy laws in the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 have adopted many of the provisions of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law for 
international insolvencies. This focuses on the universal approach. However, both the 
UNCITRAL model law and U.S. legislation specifically exempt banks. The U.S. 
approach to bank insolvency is inconsistent. It is territorial with respect to foreign banks 
that have branches in the U.S., and universalist with respect to domestic banks having 
foreign branches. U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks are chartered as separate legal 
entities and are subject to the same resolution laws and regulation as are domestic banks. 
If a foreign bank with U.S. branches fails, as did BCCI in 1991, U.S. regulators would 
seize all assets they can in the U.S. and use those to satisfy all domestic depositors and 
creditors of the branches (including uninsured claimants) before passing any surplus to 
foreign courts for distribution to foreign creditors. However, if a U.S. bank with foreign 
offices were to fail, the FDIC asserts claims over the world-wide assets of the bank and 
seeks to use those to pay off creditors under depositor preference rules which give 
priority to domestic depositors. 
 In the U.S., if banks are embedded in bank or financial holding companies 
multiple jurisdictions arise because of the different codes that apply to the parent and the 
bank subsidiary. U.S. bank and financial holding companies are non-bank corporations 
subject to the bankruptcy code, while their subsidiary banks are subject to the FDI Act. 
 
56 It is possible for creditors of a nonbank holding company subsidiary to initiate proceedings in a different 
jurisdiction than creditors of the holding company itself thus setting up a similar multiple-jurisdiction 
problem. These cases are rare as most domestic U.S. bankruptcies are consolidated into a single venue. 
57 In some instances, one group of creditors may benefit at the expense of another depending on the 
distributions of claims and assets across jurisdictions. For example, in the case of BCCI, U.S. depositors 
and creditors were paid in full, while foreign creditors suffered varying degrees of losses.  
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Where the bank insolvency leads to failure of the parent holding company, as is 
frequently the case, or the reverse, which is less frequent, different parts of the 
organization are simultaneous resolved in different venues. These simultaneous 
resolutions are occasionally adversarial particularly when there are significant non-bank 
assets at the holding company level. Conflicts may arise when the FDIC expects to suffer 
losses in the resolution of the bank and seeks to extract assets from the holding company, 
necessarily putting it in conflict with the creditors of the holding company. U.S. law 
provides little structure for handling bank/holding company insolvency proceedings. If 
the holding company has been induced to enter into a capital maintenance agreement to 
recapitalize the subsidiary bank, such agreement has priority over general creditors. In the 
absence of such an agreement, the Federal Reserve, as regulator of bank and financial 
holding companies, asserts under its “source of strength” doctrine that a holding company 
has an obligation to support its subsidiary banks, even if they are insolvent. Efforts to 
decide the matter in court have been the subject of considerable litigation to date without 
clear resolution (the relevant cases having been settled).58 Although the Fed’s application 
of PCA provisions of FDICIA that require parent holding companies to recapitalize 
undercapitalized bank subsidiaries may lessen the importance of this policy.59 
VII. Economic Analysis 
The differences in the legal features of the two insolvency resolution schemes 
analyzed in the previous sections have implication for the economic welfare and 
performance of the affected participants, be they customers of the distressed firms, 
employees, investors, or residents of either the areas served by these firms or of the 
broader economy. The major structural differences between Chapter 11 corporate  
bankruptcy and bank insolvency resolution (under the FDI Act) processes can be 
summarized as a coordinated negotiation among creditors and managers supervised by a 
 
58 Important cases are MCorp and Bank of New England Corp. The former involved attempts by regulators 
to enforce asset transfers from the holding company to the subsidiary banks after insolvency proceedings 
had begun; the latter involved pre-insolvency asset transfers that were challenged as fraudulent 
conveyances by the bankruptcy trustee. Both cases were settled before the underlying source of strength 
claims was finally ruled on. 
59 11 USC 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii) subject to 1831o(e)(2)(E). 
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“disinterested”60 court aimed at increasing the long-run payoff for all stakeholders in the 
aggregate on the one hand versus, on the other hand, an administrative process conducted 
by the FDIC (itself a major creditor and therefore an “interested” party), with limited 
participation by other parties, subject to limited judicial review, designed for speed by 
terminating the controlling interest of shareholders and managers, and mitigating both 
credit and liquidity losses through prompt closure and payment, and for minimizing the 
costs to the FDIC (deposit insurance fund). Insofar as these differences are intended to 
achieve different objectives, they are justified only if they are both necessary and 
effective in achieving their desired ends. 
 The FDIC provides for liquidity to creditors. The prompt and full payment of 
insured depositors claims at legally closed institutions before the FDIC may have 
collected the proceeds from selling the assets has gone a long way to reducing the 
liquidity losses of most depositors. Frequently, when banks are perceived to be 
distressed, uninsured depositors leave, and banks attempt to replace them with insured 
deposits. Then when the bank fails a greater proportion of the depositors are insured and 
made whole and liquid immediately. Advanced dividends paid to uninsured claimants 
promptly on the estimated recovery value, enhances liquidity further. One advantage of 
having the FDIC pay depositors quickly and assume (subrogate) their claims is to ensure 
financial market liquidity by transferring depositors’ claims to the FDIC, who generally 
has less liquidity needs than other creditors. This process, however, does not require that 
the deposit insurer manage the insolvency, only that the insurer has funds available to it 
to make the statutorily required and other advance payments. 
 The FDI Act attempts to minimize credit losses to uninsured depositors, other 
creditors, and the FDIC through a closure rule at positive book value capital.61 In part 
because most bank insolvencies since the adoption of PCA and depositor preference in 
1993 have been small banks with few non-deposit liabilities, the current structure appears 
to have worked reasonably well in achieving this goal The powers granted regulators 
 
60 The disinterestedness of the court and officers appointed by the court to act on behalf of the bankruptcy 
estate refers to absence of direct (or indirect) financial interests. This is not to say that, in practice, courts 
may not have a bias in favor of one party or the other, or that managers and creditor may not attempt to take 
advantages of such biases by “forum shopping” that is seeking to file their cases where they expect to 
receive a favorable hearing.  However, such biases are not structural in nature and are not direct necessary 
consequences of the insolvency process. 
61 See Shibut et al (2002) for a discussion of the pros and cons of two percent threshold. 
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under FDICIA to close banks preemptively appear to have encouraged many troubled 
banks to resolve their situation outside of formal bank insolvency procedures. A large 
fraction of distressed banks are voluntarily liquidated, merged with solvent banks, or 
recapitalized rather than being placed in receivership or conservatorship. This suggests 
that PCA may be forcing owners to reveal the true economic value of their bank. They 
either found a private solution if the bank was perceived to be economically viable, or 
abandon the bank if it was perceived not to be—rather than delaying recognition of the 
underlying problems. Nonetheless, the fact that almost all banks that have been closed by 
regulators since FDICIA were economically insolvent, usually imposing total losses on 
general unsecured creditors and losses on uninsured depositors and the FDIC is evidence 
that the objectives of prompt corrective action are not entirely met. In addition, loss rates 
on individual bank closures were not much different after FDICIA than it was before.62 It 
may be argued that this failure is due both to the small size of the failed banks in that 
period, the reliance on book value-based triggers, the low numerical value of the PCA 
trigger, and that prompt corrective action has created incentives for private resolutions 
(e.g., merger) for many distressed banks, so that only the worst cases needed to be closed. 
Although not reducing the loss rate on banks that are legally closed, the latter has 
probably reduced aggregate losses.  
As a result of superimposing deposit preference in 1993 on least cost resolution in 
FDICIA, the incentives for the FDIC to protect non-depositor creditors may have been 
weakened.  This is particularly likely when the insolvent bank has substantial amounts of 
non-deposit creditors. This is likely to be the case with the very largest, systemically 
important banks, as well as with some smaller specialized banks. Losses to other 
creditors are partially controlled by the FDIC through the choices in terms of speed and 
realized value made in disposing of the insolvent bank’s assets; choices which may not 
effect the losses to the insurance fund.63 Bankruptcy law, for all its complexity, is 
 
62 Evidence of before- and after-FDICIA losses in bank resolutions is somewhat ambiguous; see Kaufman 
(2004c). 
63 Least cost resolution and concomitant prudential management of insolvencies creates positive incentives 
for the FDIC to delay disbursement of funds until it is sure that they will not be needed for unanticipated 
expenses of the administration, including litigation.  While the FDIC and remaining uninsured depositors 
might benefit from reducing the pool of uninsured depositors through its powers to disallow claims, there is 
little evidence that the FDIC has used its powers to do so in the past (Adagio v. FDIC being an isolated 
instance where the courts found that deposits had been improperly reclassified). 
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designed to ensure that all creditors have representation and the process is supervised by 
a neutral party (the court) to protect all creditors’ interests. On the other hand, bank 
insolvency law is explicitly designed to primarily protect the interests of senior creditors 
by giving the FDIC as senior creditor control, limiting oversight, and mandating least 
cost (resolution only for the senior creditor). No neutral party is interposed in the process 
to protect the interests of the other creditors as is the case in corporate bankruptcy. 
Thus, while administrative proceedings have certain advantages, in terms of 
speed, lower litigation costs, and efficiency, making the deposit insurer, rather than 
another more disinterested (i.e., neutral) agent, the administrator may not to be necessary 
to achieve the other objectives outlined above. Expertise in the distressed bank’s 
condition is apt to be greatest at the bank’s primary supervisor, which may not be the 
FDIC. Expertise in resolving banks is built up through experience and such expertise 
could reside in an alternative specialized resolution authority. Timeliness and low cost of 
resolution are characteristic of an administrative process rather than who is the 
administrator. Moreover, making the deposit insurer the administrator results in a 
resolution agent who has a direct financial interest, while leaving the other creditors 
fewer rights in an administrative process than they would have in a judicial bankruptcy 
proceeding. Regardless of what agent is the administrator, the interests of all creditors 
would be served best if the primary objective of bank insolvency proceedings was to 
maximize the recovery value of the insolvent bank’s assets, as was implicitly the case 
before the introduction of depositor preference, rather than minimizing losses to one 
senior creditor as is now the case under least cost (to the insurance fund) resolution. 
If the adverse externalities of bank insolvencies, including systemic risk, are in 
fact greater than for the failure of other firms of comparable size and are primarily 
directly related to the magnitude of credit and liquidity losses at the insolvent banks—so 
that the greater these losses, the greater the adverse effects—then a special bank 
insolvency resolution regime designed to minimize or eliminate, if possible, these losses 
is desirable.  A resolution regime that encourages timely legal closure at a positive capital 
ratio facilitates these objectives, as does an administrative rather than judicial process.  
One may, of course, argue whether a book value, as specified in the FDI Act, rather than 
a market value-based closure rule is optimal; whether the minimum two percent book 
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value equity ratio closure rule provides sufficient margin to ensure against closure at 
negative economic capital with concomitant losses to depositors or other creditors; or 
whether the incentives for regulators to achieve on-time closure are sufficiently great. 
The FDI Act appears to provide the FDIC with sufficient authority to minimize 
liquidity losses. It can pay insured deposits at par value the next business day or so and 
pay advanced dividends on uninsured deposits against the bank’s estimated recovery 
value as soon as possible, so that consumer access to these accounts is not frozen.  
Liquidity losses may be further reduced by transferring loans and insured deposits and 
advanced dividends on uninsured deposits and other creditors’ funds to a newly chartered 
temporary bridge bank.  This permits borrowers at the insolvent institution ongoing 
access to their credit lines. The more recent reluctance by the FDIC to pay advanced 
dividends and the time taken in paying regular partial dividends to uninsured depositors 
suggests that liquidity provision is not as quick as is legally possible. However, the 
experience even of these creditors is far better than could be expected under general 
corporate bankruptcy where most payments to creditors are usually delayed until final 
resolution. 
Adverse externalities from bank insolvencies may be reduced further by reducing 
uncertainties surrounding the bank insolvency resolution process.  This is achieved in the 
FDI Act by not only attempting to minimize credit and liquidity losses, but for the most 
part providing absolute priority, prohibiting ex-ante appeals of decisions by the receiver 
and limiting ex-post appeals, and reducing discretion in the application of corrective 
sanctions on a timely basis.  The increased certainty may also reduce the incentives for 
banks to engage in excessive risk taking moral hazard behavior.  Lastly, the incentive for 
uninsured deposits to run may be reduced if the depositors believe that they will suffer no 
or at most minimal credit losses and have prompt access to their funds. 
What drawbacks or disadvantages may there be to such a separate bank 
insolvency regime?  To the extent that shareholders and junior creditors view themselves 
as disadvantaged by not being permitted to attempt to rescue and rehabilitate their banks, 
aggregate investment in banks may be reduced and the fairness of the process may be 
questioned. The latter could possibly ignite a search for less efficient political solutions. 
More importantly perhaps, the current bank insolvency process deprives creditors of the 
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full range of protections available in corporate bankruptcy proceedings. The 
subordination of non-depositor creditors to depositors under the Depositor Preference Act 
may result in these creditors seeking to protect themselves through security arrangements, 
e.g., repurchase agreements, offset, or other potentially less efficient means in advance, 
or through runs at the first sign of distress.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
Bank and non-bank insolvency proceedings in the U.S. contain significant, and in 
many respects fundamental, differences. These differences largely reflect different goals: 
for non-banks to protect creditors’ rights, for banks to mitigate credit and liquidity losses 
through rapid resolution. In practice, both processes fail to fully achieve their goals. For 
non-banks, the control granted managers in Chapter 11 has created dynamics that 
undermine creditors’ ability to realize the maximum amount of their claims. Supported 
by the ability to obtain debtor-in-possession financing on preferential terms to continue 
the distressed firm in operation, this leads to managers and junior creditors extracting 
concessions that they would not obtain if senior creditors controlled the process. The 
resulting protraction of the bankruptcy process is in the interests of managers, junior 
creditors, and the lawyers and other professionals involved, but is disadvantageous to 
senior creditors, unduly expensive and destructive of firm value, and has been widely 
criticized.  
If the adverse effects of bank insolvencies, including systemic risk, are in fact 
greater than for the failure of other firms of comparable size and are primarily directly 
related to the magnitude of credit and liquidity losses at the insolvent banks—so that the 
greater these losses, the greater the adverse effects—then a special bank insolvency 
resolution regime designed to minimize or eliminate, if possible, these losses is desirable.  
A resolution regime that encourages timely legal closure at a positive capital ratio 
facilitates these objectives by reducing credit losses, as does an administrative rather than 
judicial process by reducing liquidity losses. 
In addition, the FDI Act appears to provide the FDIC with sufficient authority to 
minimize liquidity losses. It can pay insured deposits at par value the next business day or 
so and pay advanced dividends on uninsured deposits against the bank’s estimated 
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recovery value as soon as possible, so that consumer access to these accounts is not 
frozen.  Liquidity losses may also be reduced by transferring loans to a newly chartered 
temporary bridge bank.  This permits borrowers at the insolvent institution ongoing 
access to their credit lines. 
In practice, U.S. bank insolvency resolution has been fairly successful in reducing 
credit losses in insolvency by legally closing banks more promptly than is the case for 
non-banks, though the evidence we have is limited to the sample of relatively small banks 
that have failed. Nonetheless, bank insolvency resolution has fallen somewhat short in 
recent years is in reducing liquidity losses to uninsured depositors. The means for 
providing liquidity available in the law have not always, particularly recently, been 
utilized in instances where losses were imposed on uninsured depositors and other 
creditors. 
Reducing uncertainties surrounding the bank insolvency resolution process should 
further reduce the adverse externalities from bank insolvencies. This is achieved in the 
FDI Act not only by attempting to minimize credit and liquidity losses, but for the most 
part providing absolute priority, prohibiting ex-ante appeals of decisions by the receiver 
and limiting ex-post appeals, and reducing discretion in the application of corrective 
sanctions on a timely basis.  The increased certainty may also reduce the incentives for 
banks to engage in excessive risk taking moral hazard behavior.  Lastly, the incentive for 
uninsured deposits to run should be reduced the more certain depositors are that they will 
not suffer credit losses in the resolution process and will have prompt access to their 
funds. 
Unfortunately the empirical evidence that we currently have on the effectiveness 
of the resolution of bank insolvencies since the adoption of PCA and FDICIA in 1991 
and depositor preference in 1993 is too limited to permit meaningful comparison with the 
greater evidence on the resolution of non-bank insolvencies and evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the two regimes. Moreover, most bank insolvencies have been small, 
while we have ample evidence of large non-bank insolvencies. Conclusions concerning 
the superiority of one regime over the other awaits further observations and analysis.
Table 1: Selected Differences between the Corporate and Banking Bankruptcy Codes
Provision Corporate Banking
Objective Maximize value of firm as “going concern”or liquidation Minimize loss to FDIC (least cost resolution)
Exception to Objective None Systemic risk exemption, if threat to stabilityof financial system
Pre-failure intervention By negotiation (voluntary) Statutory (prompt corrective action and otherstatutory grounds) (involuntary)
Initiation (declaration) of
insolvency
Major creditors and/or
management petition bankruptcy court Chartering or primary federal regulator
Creditor stays General (explicit) Less general, major exception is insureddepositors (implicit)
Receiver/trustee Appointed by court FDIC (statutory)
Management of entity during
bankruptcy
Court appointed management (trustee; in
Chapter 11 usually the existing management
initially)
FDIC
Supervisor of receiver/trustee Bankruptcy court FDIC
Structure of Process Judicial Administrative
Deviation from Priorities Negotiated among stakeholders 1) Systemic risk exemption2) If consistent with least cost resolution1
Legal standing of creditors By statute None
Creditor Representation Representative process None
Creditor Approval Unanimous agreement None
Timeliness of bankruptcy
initiation Requires default event Regulators can act preemptively
Final word Bankruptcy court FDIC (with limited right of judicial review)
Judicial Review
and appeal Ex-ante Ex-post
Legal Certainty Weak Strong
Right of offset Variable Strong
Creditor payment form
Liquidation—cash
Reorganization—securities of reorganized
firm
Cash
Receivership certificates
Legal and administrative
expenses High Low
Shareholder Interests Weak and subject to negotiation Terminated, except for residual value
Post insolvency financing Debtor in possession n/a
1 This is the position of the FDIC, but has not been legally tested.
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